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I. COURTS
A. Jurisidiction of Judge After Leaving Circuit
In the case of Hines v. Farr,1 the Court held that the cir-
cuit judge who had heard the case, but subsequently had re-
moved to another circuit, was without authority or jurisdic-
tion to include in the case any matter not before the court
at the trial of the case. Plaintiff, who had assigned his
right of action to a bank, was therefore held not to be en-
titled to have the bank substituted as a party to the action.
B. Findings of Court in Equitable Action
A case was presented to the Court which related to the
weight of the lower court's findings in equitable actions. In
Inabinet v. Inabinet,2 the Court was asked to reverse a decree
for separate maintenance and support. The plaintiff-husband
had sued for divorce on the ground of desertion. The defend-
ant-wife counterclaimed for separate maintenance and sup-
port on the grounds that the plaintiff had refused to provide
a satisfactory home for her and their child. The trial judge
entered a decree dismissing the complaint and ordered main-
tenance for the wife. The Supreme Court held that in equity
cases it would not disregard the findings of fact and conclu-
sions of the trial judge, recognizing that since he saw and
heard the witnesses, he was in a better position to evaluate
their credibility. The Court further noted that a finding of
constructive desertion in cases for separate maintenance need
not be based upon conduct that was in itself sufficient grounds
for divorce.8 In this type of case the grounds are left to the
broad discretion of a court of equity.4
1. 235 S. C. 436, 112 S. E. 2d 33 (1960).
2. 236 S. C. 52, 113 S. E. 2d 66 (1960).
3. See Mincey v. Mincey, 224 S. C. 520, 80 S. E. 2d 123 (1954), in which
the court had held that in cases for divorce based upon constructive deser-
tion, the abandoning party must establish misconduct on the part of the
other in itself and independently constituting one or more of the recognized
permitted grounds for divorce. The principle decision illustrates the more
liberal attitude of the court in cases for separate maintenance and support
where it is not restricted by statutory and constitutional provisions.
4. Machado v. Machado, 220 S. C. 90, 66 S. E. 2d 629 (1951).
339
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C. Counterclaim Beyond Jurisdictional Limit
In the case of Brother Int'l. Co. v. Southeastern Sales Co.,5
the plaintiff had initiated an action in the Richland County
Court against defendant for goods sold and delivered. The de-
fendant counterclaimed, seeking $55,000 damages for an al-
leged breach of contract accompanied by fraudulent acts. The
plaintiff's original claim was well within the jurisdictional
limit of the court.0 The defendant moved to have the case
transferred to the Court of Common Pleas, since the counter-
claim exceeded the jurisdictional limit of the county court. The
plaintiff demurred to the counterclaim and replied to the
motion. The county court in effect overruled the demurrer
by transferring the case to the Court of Common Pleas. The
Supreme Court in reversing noted the general rule that juris-
diction was determined by the amount sought by the plaintiff,
without reference to any defense or plea set up by the de-
fendant.7 The Court stated that the defendant will not be
permitted to interpose a counterclaim in excess of a court's ju-
risdiction except insofar as it may be pleaded in defense where
no affirmative relief is sought, and where the complaint is
within the proper limits. A judgment in this type of action,
where the defendant cannot properly plead the set-off, will not
preclude a later separate action on his part." Of course, the
defendant may counterclaim within the jurisdictional limits
by waiving the excess over the limit.
Since in the principal action the counterclaim exceeded the
jurisdictional limit, the holding of the court to the effect that
a portion of the defendant's claim may be used in defense
is dicta. If the principle is intended to be that there will be
no waiver of the remainder of the defendant's claim where
a portion of that claim is used in defense, the Court may be
questioned. It seems that such a procedure would amount to
allowing the defendent to split a cause of action. At the same
time, it should be recognized that there may be cases in
which it would be unjust to allow the plaintiff to recover
judgment, limiting the defendant to relief only by means of
a separate and distinct suit. Difficult considerations of the
effect of the prior judgment on the set-off as res judicata in
5. 234 S. C. 573, 109 S. E. 2d 444 (1959).
6. CODE OF LAWS OF SouTH CAROLINA § 15-764 (1952).
7. DuPre v. Gilland, 156 S. C. 109 152 S. E. 873 (1929); Corley v.
Evans, 69 S. C. 520, 48 S. E. 459 (1904).
8. DuPre v. Gilland, supra note 4.
EVol. 13
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a later action for the remainder of the defendant's claim
would arise. In the final analysis, it would seem that the
better result would be to limit the defendant either to a later
separate action or to a set-off within the jurisdictional limit
and a waiver of the excess of the claim.
D. Granting Motion for Pre-triaZ Examination Upon Unveri-
fied Complaint
In an important decision, Williamson v. South Carolina
Elec. & Gas Co.,9 the Court dealt with the matter of the
granting of a motion for a statutory pretrial examination
of an employee of the defendant based upon an unverified
complaint. The Court had previously held that such an order
might properly rest upon a verified complaint.' 0 The defend-
ant argued on the basis of these cases that such a motion
should be granted only upon a verified complaint and that
unverified pleadings could not be considered by the court in
determining whether good and sufficient cause existed for the
examination. The trial court's determination that good and
sufficient reason for the examination did exist was based
upon the unverified pleadings supported by affidavits. The
Court noted that the defendant had not properly preserved his
right to appeal from this determination by the lower court."
However, the Supreme Court did review the pleadings and
affidavits and held that good and sufficient reason did exist
and that there had been no abuse of discretion by the trial
judge. It was held to be proper for the judge to refer to the
unverified complaint to determine the issues for the trial and
a motion for examination of an adverse party, supported by
affidavits, could be granted under the provisions of section
26-503, South Carolina Code of Laws (1952).
E. Original Jurisdiction
In one case the Court considered its original jurisdiction.
Ex parte Modern Fin. Co. v. Wilbur Hicks.12 Plaintiff sought
a writ of prohibition to enjoin the Juvenile-Domestic Relations
Judge of Greenville from requiring certain debtors to pay all
their income into his court and, after certain deductions for
living expenses, paying the debtor's creditors proportionate
9. 236 S. C. 101, 113 S. E. 2d 345 (1960).
10. United States Tire Co. v. Keystone Tire Sales Co., 153 S. C. 56, 150
S. E. 347, 66 A. L. R. 1264 (1929); People's Bank v. Helms, 140 S. C. 107,
138 S. E. 622 (1927).
11. See McKay, Practice and Procedure, 12 S. C. L. Q. 80 at 102 (1959).
12. 235 S. C. 212, 110 S. E. 2d 859 (1959).
19611
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amounts of their debts, meanwhile enjoining the creditors
from pursuing their legal remedies against the debtors. The
respondent agreed to the Supreme Court's original jurisdic-
tion, but the Court refused to hear the case on the merits.
It said that under Supreme Court Rule 20, the Court's orig-
inal jurisdiction should not be invoked where relief is avail-
able in the circuit court, unless special emergency or public
interests are involved. In this case there was held to be no
good reason why the circuit court could not pass on the issues.
The agreement of the respondent is insufficient to invoke
the Court's jurisdiction.
II. DEMURRER
A. Appealability of Overruling Demurrer
In Mullins v. Celanese Corp., 13 the plaintiffs, as employees
of the defendant, brought an action to compel their employer
to cease demanding work on Sunday as a condition of em-
ployment. The defendant moved for summary judgment but
the trial judge concluded that the pleadings before him raised
issues of fact and denied defendant's motion. Justice Legge,
speaking for the Court, stated that the motion for summary
judgment by the defendant was in the nature of a demurrer 1
4
and that if the pleadings raised issues of law only, the denial
of the order involved the merits of the case and was, there-
fore, appealable forthwith.1 5
The present case involved two issues, one concerning the
construction of a statute and the other the constitutionality
of the same statute. Both of these were held to be legal
rather than factual issues and the Supreme Court, therefore,
held that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed.
III. VENUE
A. In General
In Garrett v. Charleston & W. C. R. R.,16 the Court again
refused to reverse a trial judge's ruling that the defendant
did not show both convenience of witnesses and that the ends
13. 234 S. C. 380, 108 S. E. 2d 547 (1959).
14. Page v. North Carolina Mut. Life Co., 207 S. C. 277, 35 S. E. 2d
716 (1945).
15. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 15-123(1) (1952); Elliott v.
Pollitzer, 24 S. C. 81 (1886). Cf. Johnson v. Abney Mills, 219 S. C. 231,
64 S. E. 2d 641 (1951).
16. 236 S. C. 75, 113 S. E. 2d 256 (1960).
[Vo]. 13
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of justice would be promoted by a change of venue where
defendant had no affidavits from prospective witnesses them-
selves.
B. Suit Against Foreign Corporation
Of more interest than Garrett, supra, on the venue question
is Sanders v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. 17 Defendant, a foreign
corporation, was sued in Barnwell County and moved to
change the venue to Orangeburg County, supporting its mo-
tion by affidavits showing that it had a resident agent in
Orangeburg who conducted defendant's business there. Plain-
tiff's counter-affidavit said that no place of business of de-
fendant could be found in Orangeburg. The trial judge denied
the motion. In affirming, the Court re-affirmed its previous
holdings that under section 10-303, South Carolina Code of
Laws (1952), a foreign corporation may be sued in any
county unless it has a "residence" in some county in the
state. Reviewing the cases involving "residence" of a corpo-
ration for venue purposes, the Court held that to establish
"residence," it must be shown that the corporation has both
an agent and an office for the transaction of business. Since
defendant did not show that it had an office in Orangeburg,
the Court held the trial judge was justified in refusing to
change the venue. The majority opinion was strongly criticized
by Justice Oxner in a dissent which said that the Court was
imposing a new requirement for venue purposes, namely an
office, which was not supported by past decisions.
C. Discretion of Trial Judge
In the case of Bryant v. Aiken Petroleum Co., 8 the Supreme
Court was asked to review a decision from below denying de-
fendant's motion for a change of venue. While many of the wit-
nesses for the defendant were residents of Charleston County,
the county to which the defendant had requested removal, cer-
tain of the plaintiff's witnesses could more conveniently testify
in the original county of suit. The Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court, stating that it was well-settled that the decision
as to change of venue is addressed to the discretion of the
trial judge and will not be reversed unless there is manifest
error of law.19
17. 237 S. C. 133, 111 S. E. 2d 201 (1959).
18. 234 S. C. 300, 108 S. E. 2d 95 (1959).
19. Herndon v. Huckabee Transp. Co., 231 S. C. 364, 98 S. E. 2d 833
(1957); McCauley v. McLeod, 230 S. C. 380, 95 S. E. 2d 611 (1956).
1961]
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In addition to various rules regarding proper venue, section
10-310, South Carolina Code of Laws (1952), provides that the
venue may be changed when there is reason to believe that a
fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the proper county or
when the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice
would be promoted by the change. In South Carolina E. & G.
Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co.,20 an action on a fire insurance policy,
the venue was laid in Lexington County. Defendants moved
for a change of venue, supporting their motion by affidavits
alleging, inter alia, that plaintiff was the largest taxpayer
in Lexington County and was very popular there. The Su-
preme Court affirmed the trial judge's refusal to change the
venue, holding that since a motion to change venue is ad-
dressed to the trial judge's discretion, his decision will not
be reversed unless he is manifestly wrong. The burden is
on the defendant to show that convenience of witnesses and
the ends of justice would be promoted by the change, and
no witness afXirmed that it would be inconvenient to try
the case in Lexington. Furthermore, popularity alone is
not a proper ground to support change of venue.
In Graham v. Beverly,21 plaintiff sought to sue defendant,
a resident of Horry County, in Marion County. After de-
fendant successfully moved venue to Horry, plaintiff sought
to have the case changed back to Marion, supporting his
motion by twenty-three affidavits that Marion would be more
convenient. Only two affiants (plaintiff and a passenger)
were eye-witnesses. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial
judge's refusal to remand, holding that no abuse of discre-
tion was shown.
IV. DIscovERY
One interesting case involved the scope of discovery allow-
able under our somewhat limited state discovery practice.
Dunlap v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 22 was an action by a
dentist to compel continued payment of disability benefits.
Defendant moved and obtained an order requiring plaintiff
to submit records of his stocks and bond transactions. On
appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that under
the substantive law private income from investments will
20. 230 S. C. 340, 110 S. E. 2d 165 (1959).
21. 235 S. C. 222, 110 S. E. 2d 923 (1959).
22. 235 S. C. 206, 110 S. E. 2d 856 (1959).
344 [Vol. 13
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not divest an insured from the benefits of a disability policy.
The Court held that a party is not required to submit to
examination on matters wholly irrelevant to the issues and,
therefore, that part of the pre-trial discovery order should
be reversed.
V. TIME WITHIN WHICH PLEADING MUST BE SERVED
A. Late Answer Permitted
In two cases the Court permitted answering after time had
expired, affirming the lower court in one case and reversing
in the other. Holliday v. Holliday23 involved a suit for di-
vorce by a husband in the Court of Common Pleas which
was begun the same day as a suit for separate maintenance
by the wife in the county court. While negotiations pro-
ceeded in the county court suit, the time for answering the
common pleas complaint expired, and the husband there
obtained a reference and a Master's Report recommending
the husband be granted a divorce. The wife then moved for
permission to answer which the trial judge granted. The
Supreme Court held that the trial judge should not be re-
versed unless (1) his decision was controlled by some error
of law, or (2) his order was based on factual considerations
without any evidentiary support. Under the circumstances,
including the nature of the action (divorce), the fact that
negotiations were pending, and the haste with which the
common pleas action was pushed, the trial judge was held
to have committed no abuse of discretion.
In MeGhee v. One Chevrolet Sedan,24 the Court permitted
answering where application was made on the twenty-first
day after the summons without complaint was served on an
automobile which had been stolen from the owner in Florida
and which had been attached and served without notice hav-
ing reached the owner. The Court held that where merito-
rious defense is shown and prompt application is made, the
statute permitting late answer should be liberally construed.
B. Service by Mail
In Ex parte Wessinger,2 5 the Court construed section 10-
465, South Carolina Code of Laws (1952), which provides
23. 235 S. C. 246, 111 S. E. 2d 205 (1959).
24. 235 S. C. 37, 109 S. E. 2d 713 (1959).
25. 235 S. C. 239, 111 S. E. 2d 13 (1959).
1961] 345
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that when service is by mail, "double the time required in
cases of personal service shall be given." Plaintiff had sought
to utilize this section to permit him to serve by mail notice
of appeal from condemnation award two days after statutory
time had expired. But the Court held the statute inapplicable
and that the statute gives the recipient double time, not the
party making the service by mail.
VI. AMENDMENT TO PLEADINGS
Section 10-692, South Carolina Code of Laws (1952), per-
mits amendments to the pleadings by the trial court in
various circumstances, one being "(d) when the amendment
does not change substantially the claim or defense, conform-
ing the pleading or proceeding to the facts proved." Apply-
ing this section in Gary v. Jordan,26 the Court permitted
amendment of the complaint after close of plaintiff's case
in an action for misrepresentation based on the sale to plain-
tiff of diseased cattle, by substituting the phrase "tested by
the defendant" for the phrase "sold to the plaintiff." The
Court held that such amendment effected no substantial
change in the plaintiff's claim and hence was properly al-
lowed.
VII. EVIDENCE
A. Proving Alleged Joint and Concurrent Acts of Negligence
Johnson v. Charleston & W. C. Ry.27 was a wrongful death
action arising from a crossing accident. A verdict was found
for the plaintiff in the trial court, and on appeal, the defend-
ant railway argued that the plaintiff had alleged joint and
concurring acts of negligence, every one of which, defendant
asserted, must be proved under the authority of Osteen v. At-
lantic Coast Line Ry.28 In Osteen the complaint had alleged
four specific acts *of negligence, then asserted that in the
absence of any of the alleged acts, the accident would not
have occurred. In the case under discussion, before setting
out certain alleged acts of negligence, the complaint alleged
that the death resulted from "'the joint and concurrent tor-
tious acts... (of the defendant and its agents), combining
and concurring in the following particulars . ' ",29
26. 236 S. C. 144, 113 S. E. 2d 730 (1960).
27. 234 S. C. 448, 108 S. E. 2d 777 (1959).
28. 119 S. C. 438, 112 S. E. 352 (1922).
29. 234 S. C. 448, at 462, 108 S. E. 2d 777, at 783.
346 [Vol. 13
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The Court first pointed out that the statement of Justice
Fraser in the Osteen case on which defendant relied was not
in the main opinion of that en bane decision, but admitted
that it was probably correct in light of the unusual allega-
tion in the complaint that the accident would not have occur-
red absent any one of the acts of negligence. Absent this
allegation in the present complaint, the Court held the plain-
tiff was entitled to recover on proof of any one of the alleged
acts of negligence.
B. Scintilla Rule
The Court once again in Jackson v. Jackson0 has thrown
doubt upon the question of whether South Carolina still fol-
lows the scintilla rule. The Court stated that there should
be a directed verdict only where reasonable minds could draw
but one inference from the testimony. While South Carolina
in recent years has continued to follow the scintilla rule eo
nomine, by defining a scintilla of evidence in terms of rea-
sonable men it has achieved essentially the same result as
other jurisdictions which have abandoned this rule. It may be
that the Supreme Court is ready to abandon its previous ad-
herence to form and state the South Carolina rule in the
simple terms of reasonable conclusion.
VIII. TRIAL
A. Counsel's Arguraent to Jury
Several points concerning the propriety of counsel's argu-
ment to the jury were decided in the case of Johnson v.
Charleston & W. C. Ry.31 Defendant appealed from a verdict
for plaintiff in a wrongful death action arising from a cross-
ing accident.
The Court first held it proper for counsel to use a black-
board for purposes of illustrating arguable points to the jury.
It was pointed out that the same rules apply to such visual
arguments as are applicable to oral arguments. Any points
illustrated must have a reasonable foundation in the evidence
or be fairly arguable therefrom. Although abuse of the visual
aids to argument may be so flagrant as to warrant a new
trial, control of the use of such aids rests in the sound dis-
cretion of the trial judge.
30. 234 S. C. 291, 108 S. E. 2d 86 (1959).
31. 234 S. C. 448, 108 S. E. 2d 777 (1959).
1961]
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The second point concerned the proper use of the black-
board. Defendant relied on two grounds of alleged impro-
priety: (1) that calculations were made by plaintiff's counsel
by use of figures not drawn from the testimony; and (2)
multiplication of the decedent's annual income by his life
expectancy. Defendant had made timely objection that part
of the figures used were not drawn from the evidence, and
had requested a charge that the calculations were not evidence
but mere argument. The trial judge expressed his opinion
that they were used only as argument, and invited defend-
ant to offer written instructions on the point. Defendant
did not do so, and the Supreme Court held that there was no
error in the court's refusal to give the requested charge.
The final point was decided adversely to the defendant
because of his failure to make timely objection. The final
arguments to the jury were made in this case in November,
1957. When the defendant made his new trial motion in
August, 1958, he first raised the point that plaintiff's coun-
sel had improperly argued that a human life, in Allendale
County, where the case was tried, was worth as much as a
life in Hampton or Charleston counties, and that juries in
Allendale should make wrongful death awards comparable
to those of the other two counties. At the hearing of the new
trial motion, plaintiff's counsel denied making such state-
ments, and offered to make an affidavit to that effect. On
appeal, the Supreme Court stated the general rule that any
objections the defendant had to the arguments of opposing
counsel should have been raised at the time of the argument,
and that only in flagrant cases where prejudice appeared
would the point be considered after the verdict was rendered.
To decide the question on appeal would require the determina-
tion of a factual question on which the trial court had not
passed, thus the new trial motion was held properly denied
on this point.
B. Questions for Jury
In the case of Dean v. Temptron, InC.S2 and Edwards v.
Great Am. Ins. Co. 3 the court held that where the evidence
was conflicting, the issues were properly left to the jury.
It is the jury's duty also to pass upon the credibility of the
32. 234 S. C. 532, 109 S. E. 2d 167 (1959).
33. 234 S. C. 404, 108 S. E. 2d 582 (1959).
[Vol. 13
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witnesses. If the jury's verdict is not wholly unsupported by
the evidence, the Supreme Court will, affirm.
C. Mistrial
In Kirven v. Lawrence,34 a case was submitted to the jury
at 11:40 a.m. At 4:35 p.m., the judge left the court after
giving the clerk instructions tor dismiss the jury with a
mistrial if it had not reached a decision by 11:00 p.m. At
11:00 p.m. the clerk knocked on the jury room door, and one
of the jurors responded and asked for fifteen minutes more
deliberation. The same occurred at 11:15. The plaintiff ob-
jected, but defendant wanted to let the jury continue delib-
erating. At 11:30, the jury returned a verdict for the plain-
tiff. On defendant's appeal on the ground that the jury had
been "coerced" into continuing deliberation, the Court held
that the defendant had acquiesced in letting the jury delib-
erate the extra half hour. Furthermore, the Court held that
the clerk's conversations with a juror at the jury room door
did not constitute "multiple returns" which would, under
section 38-303, South Carolina Code of Laws (1952), require
a mistrial. The Court said a "return" implies a voluntary
return by the jury.
D. Discretion of Trial Judge
In the ease of Corley v. South Carolina Highway Dept.,35
the court considered the question of whether the trial judge
had committed error by refusing to give a requested charge
that the jury was not to take into consideration the fact
that there might be further damages. The defendant had
agreed to move certain buildings from a right-of-way which
it had purchased from the plaintiff and restore them to their
equivalent condition on another portion of the plaintiff's
land. The plaintiff brought the action alleging that the build-
ing had not been properly restored and was in fact badly
damaged. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plain-
tiff. Mr. Justice Taylor spoke for the Court in affirming the
decision below. He noted that the verdict was well within
the testimony as to the value of the building and that it did
not appear from the record that the jury considered any
damages other than those which naturally and logically flowed
34. 235 S. C. 380, 111 S. E. 2d 692 (1959).
35. 234 S..C. 504,-109 S. E. 2d 164 (1959).
19611
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from the acts complained of.36 The Court, therefore, would
not consider the question of whether future damages to the
building could be proven under a general allegation of dam-
ages or whether such damages must be specially pleaded.
An unusual point was involved in the case of Dean v. Temp-
tron, Inc.,37 where during the course of the plaintiff's testi-
mony he had referred to one of the witnesses for the defend-
ant as an "unmitigated liar". The defendant argued that
the trial judge should have declared a mistrial on the basis
of this improper statement. The Supreme Court pointed out
that while the statement of the plaintiff was certainly im-
proper, the determination of whether it precluded an impartial
consideration of the case by the jury was a matter resting
within the sound discretion of the trial judge. The trial
judge had promptly admonished the witness and cautioned
the jury that the remark was improper. The Supreme Court
held that there had been no abuse of discretion by the trial
judge in refusing to order a mistrial.
IX. DIRECTED VERDICT
A. Creating Jury Issue by Cross-Examination of Opponent's
Witness
In the case of Jackson v. Jackson,38 the court held, in accord
with its prior decisions, that the defendant may elicit suf-
ficient evidence upon cross-examination of the plaintiff's wit-
nesses to avoid a directed verdict.39 Also, the court noted
that it was for the jury to pass upon the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight of the evidence, taking into con-
sideration the witnesses' interest in the result, the accuracy
of her recollections and all other evidence that would tend
to refute or discredit her testimony.40 To justify a court in
directing a verdict, there must be nothing in the circumstances
tending to create distrust of the truthfulness of the testi-
mony.
41
36. Crozier v. Charleston & W. C. Ry. Co., 222 S. C. 121, 71 S. E. 2d
805 (1952). Cf. Hobbs v. Carolina Coca Cola Bottling Co., 194 S. C. 543,
10 S. E. 2d 25 (1940). See also Henry Sonneborn & Co. v. Southern Ry.
Co., 65 S. C. 502, 44 S. E. 77 (1903).
37. 234 S. C. 532, 109 S. E. 2d 167 (1959).
38. 234 S. C. 291, 108 S. E. 2d 86 (1959).
39. Greenville County v. Stover, 198 S. C. 240, 17 S. E. 2d 535 (1941);
Eargle v. Sumter Lighting Co., 110 S. C. 560, 96 S. E. 909 (1917).
40. Jones v. Atlanta-Charlotte Airline Ry. Co., 218 S. C. 537, 63 S. E.
2d 476, 26 A. L. R. 2d 297 (1951).
41. Green v. Greenville County, 176 S. C. 433, 180 S. E. 471 '(1935).
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It seems that under the facts of this case, the holding of
the court is correct since the defendant's cross-examination
of two policemen who were witnesses for the plaintiff tended
to contradict portions of the plaintiff's testimony. Thus, the
credibility of the plaintiff was properly in issue and for the
jury's decision. It would be improper, however, to extend the
principle of this case to other cases wherein there has not
been contradiction of the plaintiff's testimony. Certainly,
where there is substantially uncontradicted evidence, the case
should not be left to the jury simply upon the question of
credibility.
X. TImELY PRESERVATION OF RIGHTS
A. Timely Objection
In Edwards v. Great Am. Ins. Co.,42 the court was faced with
a question involving the waiver of a forfeiture provision in an
insurance policy. The defendant attempted to argue on ap-
peal that the local agent was only a soliciting agent and,
therefore, could not waive the contract provisions. The Su-
preme Court speaking through Mr. Justice Legge, disallowed
this ground of appeal because the point had not been raised
in the trial court and, therefore, was not available in the
Supreme Court. The Court also refused to consider ques-
tions not presented in the lower court in other cases.43
In the case of Van Dolson v. Earles,44 the Court held that
if no objection is raised to an erroneous charge, any possible
objections will be waived. The Supreme Court also held in
this case that where no demand for interest was made in the
complaint and no mention of interest was made in the charge
to the jury or in the verdict, it was error for the trial judge
to allow interest from the date of demand upon an unpaid
claim, on the ground that to allow interest not demanded in
th6 complaint would permit a recovery in excess of the sum
prayed for.
The case of Mahaffey v. Mahaffey45 was one of several
cases involving the necessity of raising objection at the prop-
er time. After charging the jury, the trial judge had excused
the jury and given counsel an opportunity to express any
42. 234 S. C. 404, 108 S. E. 2d 582 (1959).
43. Williamson v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas. Co., 236 S. C. 101, 113
S. E. 2d 345 (1960); Hines v. Farr, 235 S. C. 486, 112 S. E. 2d 33 (1960).
44. 234 S. C. 593, 109 S. E. 2d 456 (1959).
45. 236 S. C. 64, 113 S. E. 2d 72 (1960).
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objections or to request additional charges.46 The appellants,
having raised no objection at that time to the charge, were
held to have no right to question it on appeal.47 However,
as noted above, the court did decide the case on the merits
in spite of this deficiency.
XI. RES JUDICATA AND LAW OF THE CASE
A. In General
Two cases involved the sometimes elusive doctrine of "the
law of the case." In Turbevile v. Gordon48 plaintiff sued for
the balance due for construction of a house. Formerly, de-
fendant had demurred on the ground that the complaint
showed on its face that plaintiff sought to charge defendant
on an oral promise to pay another's debts, but the Supreme
Court had overruled the demurrer, holding that the com-
plaint could be construed as alleging that defendant was the
primary obligor. After remittitur, defendant raised the same
defense by answer and obtained a judgment on the pleadings.
On appeal the Court reversed, holding that its former de-
cision as to the construction which might reasonably be
placed on the complaint was the law of the case and judg-
ment for defendant on the pleadings was error.
A more difficult case is Dukes v. Hygrade Food Prod.
Corp.49 The plaintiff sued for the balance due on an electrical
contracting job for defendant's plant Defendant answered,
alleging, inter alia, that a long and complicated contract was
involved, which was too complicated for a jury, and asked
for a reference. The reference was refused and no appeal
was taken. Subsequently, at the trial of the case before
another judge, the judge on his own motion ruled that the
issues were too complicated for a jury and referred the
matter to a referee. The Court reversed, holding that the
first judge's order denying reference was the law of the
case and cited Circuit Rule 60 which forbids a judge from
granting an order on application therefor if such order has
been refused in whole or part by another judge. With due
respect for our Court, it seems to this writer that the fact
46. CoD o LAws oF SoUTH CArtoLiNA § 10-1210 (1952).
47. G. A. C. Finance Corp. v. Citizens and Southern Nat'l Bank, 234
S. C. 205, 107 S. E. 2d 315 (1959) ; Tute v. Lambusca, 231 S. C. 429,'99
S. E. 2d 39 (1951).
48. 236 S. C. 57, 113 S. E. 2d 68 (1960).
49. 236 S. C. 69, 113 S. E. 2d 254 (1960).
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the judge on .his own motion decided to refer -the matter
makes Rule 60 inapplicable. Futhermore, it seems that the
judge who is trying the case should have greater latitude
in issuing an order, even if the question has been passed
on by a prior judge, when the issues are such that they do
not become fully apparent until the case is being tried.
In the case of Hines v. Farr5° the Court held that a judg-
ment in a prior action is res judicata in a subsequeni action
between the same parties where the same subject matter is
involved and the adjudication in the former suit was of the
precise question sought to be raised in the second suit. The
plaintiff, a grading contractor, brought this action against
the defentant for the amount due on a contract. In a previous
action between the same parties, the Court had held that the
present plaintiff was not entitled to arbitration of the con-
tract and that the decision of the architect was final. The
defendant was held to be barred from raising the defense
that there had been no arbitration of the architect's cer-
tificate.
B. Collateral Attack Upon Judgment
In the case of Singleton v. Muflins Lumber Co.,51 Justice
Legge attempted to clarify the South Carolina decisions re-
garding attacks Vpon final judgments of courts in this state.
In this case, the Court held that an equitable proceeding which
sought equitable relief and had for its very purpose the
overthrow of a final judgment was not a collateral attack
upon a prior judgment.
There had been a foreclosure and sale decree rendered
against the present plaintiff and others in 1909. In the pres-
ent action, some fifty years after the prior decree was ren-
dered, the plaintiff seeks to have the earlier foreclosure
decree set aside and to have herself declared the owner of
the property in question, alleging that there had been no
legal service of process upon her in the prior action. How-
ever, the testimony of the plaintiff in the trial of the present
case, concerning the service of process upon her in the earlier
action, had two versions: (1) that she had been served by
the plaintiff himself in the earlier foreclosure action, which
testimony the Supreme Court held should not have been
50. 235 S. Q. 436, 112 S. E. 2d 33 (1959).
51. 234 S. C. 330, 108 S. E. 2d 414 (1959).
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admitted on grounds of the Dead Man's Statute,5 2 and (2)
that she had not been served at all. The Court held this
latter version to be "negative" testimony (i.e., not involving
a "transaction" with the deceased), which holding led to
the main point decided in the case-whether ,the plaintiff
could maintain this equitable action to set aside the prior
judgment. This necessitated Justice Legge's discussion of
the earlier South Carolina decisions regarding the distinction
between direct and collateral attacks on final judgments.
After pointing up the earlier decisions and their presump-
tions in favor of the validity of a final judgment, Justice
Legge then analyzed the cases dealing with direct and col-
lateral attacks, and concluded that all of them could be classi-
fied in the following manner:
(a) The only direct attack is by motion or other pro-
ceeding in the cause in which the judgment is rendered;
(b) Every other attempt to overthrow a judgment is
a collateral attack;
(c) Collateral attack will lie only where the defect
or infirmity is apparent upon the face of the record
or judgment;
(d) Direct attack will lie not only for defect or in-
firmity apparent upon the record of the judgment, but
also for a hidden defect or infirmity for proof of which
resort must be had to evidence dehors such record;
(e) The judgment may also be attacked, for defect
or infirmity not apparent upon its record, by a separate,
independent suit in equity.53
Justice Legge then pointed up the apparent inconsistency
between classification (e) and classifications (a), (b) and
(c). However, this conflict, he asserts, disappears when the
term "collateral attack" is limited to actions at law. To sup-
port his conclusion that a suit in equity attacking a final
judgment is not a collateral attack, he relies upon the state-
ment in Southern Porcelain Mfg. Co. v. Thew5 4 that "'the
validity of the judgment cannot be called in question in any
subsequent action at law."' (Emphasis added)
The Court proceeded to place two limitations upon its
holding that an equitable proceeding attacking a final judg-
52. CODE OF LAWS OF SouTH CAROLINA § 26-402 (1952).
53. 234 S. C. 330, 108 S. E. 2d 414 (1959).
54. 5 S. C. 5 (1873).
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ment was a direct and not a collateral attack: (1) "such a
suit can be maintained only upon grounds entitling the plain-
tiff to equitable, as distinguished from legal, relief;" and
(2) "such a suit must have for its very purpose the impeach-
ment or overthrow of the judgment; its attack upon the
judgment may not be presented as an issue incidental to
some other, independent purpose." 55
Although this case was held to be a direct attack upon the
judgment, the evidence was held insufficient to overcome the
presumptions which have been established in favor of a final
court decree.
XII. APPEALS
A. Scope of Review
In the case of Chapman v. Scott, 56 the Court reviewed a
foreclosure action in which the defendant claimed the right
to credit insurance proceeds paid to the plaintiff against
the mortgage indebtedness. This claim had been disallowed
by the circuit judge. Since the proceeding was in equity,
the Court reviewed both the challenged findings of fact as
well as matters of law,57 concluding, however, that the evi-
dence preponderated in favor of the respondent and affirmed
the circuit judge.
In Charles A. Allen, Inc. v. Island Co-op Assn.58 the plain-
tiff brought an action for breach of contract and sought to
attach the proceeds of a draft held by a bank. The central
issue in the case was whether the bank owned the draft or
was simply acting as a collection agent for Island Co-op.
The Master admitted evidence to the effect that an employee
of the Co-op had compromised a prior claim upon a similar
draft. In reversing, the court stated that evidence as to this
arrangement was inadmissible and, therefore, the defendant's
evidence was uncontradicted. Judgment was granted for the
defendant.
The scope of the Supreme Court's review in law and equity
cases is an elusive concept, and the Court considered this in
several cases. In Davis v. Sparks,59 an equity matter (mort-
gage foreclosure), the Court refused to reverse two con-
55. 234 S. C. 330, at 348, 108 S. E. 2d 414, at 423.
56. 234 S. C. 469, 109 S. E. 2d 1 (1959).
57. Twitty v. Harrison, 230 S. C. 174, 94 S. E. 2d 879 (1956).
58. 234 S. C. 537, 109 S. E. 2d 446 (1959).
59. 235 S. C. 326, 111 S. E. 2d 545 (1959).
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current findings of fact. The Court said the appellant had
to show that the findings of fact are "without evidentiary"
support" or are "against the clear preponderance of evidence,"
and appellant had not shown this. In Johnson v. Johnson6o
and Campbell v. Christian,"' both law cases, the Court refused
to reverse findings of fact by lower courts, holding that if
there is "any evidence" to support the trial judge's factual
conclusions, they would not be upset.
B. Statement of Exceptions
The Court, in the period under discussion, considered sev-
eral cases arising under Supreme Court Rule 4, section 6. In
Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. McElmurray,6 2 the trial judge had
struck the answer of the defendant as sham, frivolous and
irrelevant and granted judgment on the pleadings to the
plaintiff. The defendant excepted to the granting of the
plaintiff's motion, "the assigned error being the court granted
plaintiff's motion made upon that ground." Mr. Justice
Taylor noted numerous cases6 3 in which the Court had stated
that "every ground of appeal ought to be so distinctly stated
that the court may at once see the point it would be called
upon to decide." The object of an exception is to present
some distinct principle or question of law which the appellant
claims to have been violated in the trial of the case. Where
these tests have not been met and the exception is too gen-
eral, vague and indefinite, the Court will refuse to consider
the appeal.
At times, preparation of the statement of exceptions is one
of the most difficult matters in prosecuting an appeal, as a
case may be dismissed if the exceptions are not properly
prepared. In Poison v. Burr,64 the Court held in an action
growing out of a three-vehicle collision that the exception
that the judge "erred in not permitting a joinder of parties"
was too general. Furthermore, the Court could not intelli-
gently consider the matter because of the transcript of record
failed to include the judge's order appealed from.
60. 235 S. C. 542, 112 S. E. 2d 647 (1960).
61. 235 S. C. 102, 110 S. E. 2d 1 (1959).
62. 236 S. C. 141, 113 S. E. 2d 756 (1960).
63. See, i.e., Hewitt v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 235 S. C. 201, 110 S. E. 2d
852 (1959); Brady v. Brady, 222 S. C. 242, 72 S. E. 2d 193 (1952); Gordon
v. Rothberg, 213 S. C. 492, 50 S. E. 2d 202 (1948).
64. 235 S. C. 216, 110 S. E. 2d 855 (1959).
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*Hewitt v. Reserve Life Ins. Co.6 5 is more interesting to
practicing lawyers because it gives some guidance in prepar-
ing exceptions. The exceptions simply stated that the trial
judge erred in not granting judgment non obstante veredicto
or a new trial. The Court said:
The object of an exception is to present some distinct
principle or question of law which the appellant claims
to have been violated by the Court in the trial of the
case from which the appeal is taken, and to present it
in such form that it may be properly reviewed.
In the case of Mahaffey v. MalJaffey, 6 the Court was pre-
sented with an appeal from a case involving a will. The
defendant appealed on the grounds that the trial judge had
committed error in permitting the question "Is the will good?"
to be put before the questions "Was there a lack of mental
capacity?" and "Was there undue influence?" upon special
interrogatories. The Court held that this failed to specify
sufficiently the grounds upon which the appellant objected
to the order of the questions and, therefore, violated Supreme
Court Rule 4, section 6. Mr. Justice Legge, however, for the
court, went on to rule that the plaintiff had not raised the
objection at the proper time 'before the trial court and also
ruled against the plaintiff on the merits. These latter hold-
ings are discussed in other sections of this article.
C. Failure to Perfect Appeal
In Associated Petroleum Carriers v. Mutual Properties,
Ino.,67 the Court reversed a lower court's refusal to dismiss
an appeal for failure of appellant to serve a proposed tran-
script within thirty days after notice of intention to appeal.
The Court said that if a proposed transcript cannot be served
in time, appellant should either get opposing counsel's con-
sent to an extension, or on four days' notice, move for a
court order extending time. All this must be done within
the thirty-day period.
D. Matters Appealable
In Gary v. Jordan6 the Court reaffirmed the well-settled
proposition that a party must reserve his prior objection to
a witness' testimony or counsel's questions when he later
65. 235 S. C. 201, 110 S. E. 2d 852 (1959).
66. 236 S. C. 64, 113 S. E. 2d 72 (1960).
67. 235 S. C. 195, 110 S. E. 2d 861 (1959).
68. 236 S. C. 144, 113 S. E. 2d 730 (1960).
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questions the witness about the same subject matter. Other-
wise, the original objection is held to have been waived.
Furthermore, the Court will not consider a matter on appeal
if the lower court has not passed upon it. Campbell v. Calvert
Fire Ins. Co.69 In this case the defendant sought to raise
the defense that the insured did not give timely notice to
insurer, not having raised it in the pleadings.
Ordinarily an order refusing a motion to strike is not ap-
pealable,70 but such an appeal was permitted in Thomas v.
Colonial Stores, Inc.,71 because the motion to strike defend-
ant's second defense was in the nature of a demurrer, in-
volving the merits and going to the heart of the defense.
XIII. FEDERAL CASES
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' cases from South Caro-
lina did not present any novel procedural points. The two
cases arising with procedural points merely reaffirmed the
established proposition that in considering a motion for di-
rected verdict, the court must accept as true all facts favor-
able to the plaintiff which the evidence tends to prove and
resolve all reasonable inferences against the defendant. If
there is more than one reasonable inference, the case must
go to the jury. Grooms v. Minute-Maid,7 2 Town of Ninety-Six
v. Southern Ry. 73
69. 234 S. C. 583, 109 S. E. 2d 572 (1959).
70. CODE oF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLiNA § 15-123 (1952); Cooper v. At-
lantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 78 S. C. 562, 59 S. E. 704 (1905).
71. 236 S. C. 95, 113 S. E. 2d 337 (1960).
72. 267 F. 2d 541 (4th Cir. 1959).
73. 267 F. 2d 579 (4th Cir. 1959).
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